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Brietzke: The Rightness of the "Rightness of Things"

THE RIGHTNESS OF "THE RIGHTNESS OF THINGS"*
PAUL H. BRIETZKE**
INTRODUCTION

Pastor Neuhaus speaks with a rare fire, saying things in ways
which should penetrate the groves of academe, if not the corridors
of power. I am not qualified to evaluate the no doubt abundant
theological merits of the lecture and will thus confine myself to examining its contributions to legal discourse. I feel free to do so
because Neuhaus seeks to bring theology to the lawyers. My attempt to do justice to his arguments is spurred by the realization
that justice is what they are all about, a matter which is not
clarified until the lecture is almost over. Taking the brevity of the
lecture and the nature of its audience into account, Pastor Neuhaus
seems to have bitten off more than he can comfortably chew. On a
closer reading, his arguments lack specificity, are contradictory and
leave too many significant issues unresolved.
Lawyers qua lawyers are bound to regard Neuhaus' generalizations and reasoning processes with at least some suspicion. While
lawyers are familiar with a syllogistic system of precedent, under
which a conclusion in one case subsequently becomes the premise of
another, the seemingly dialectical process by which major conclusions of the lecture are simultaneously their own premises' suggests
a perfect circularity of reasoning. This process would have to be explained and all of the premises articulated before it can be
understood by lawyers such as myself. The first canon we are
taught in law school is to distrust over-generalization as the locus of
arbitrariness and incompetence. A "cult of professionalism" fosters
among lawyers notions of a justice encompassing particular rights
and duties generating specific claims and counterclaims which are
dealt with as technical or administrative exercises on a case-by-case

*1 would like to thank James Albers, Richard Baepler and Jack Hiller for
their helpful comments on a draft of this article. Errors are solely my responsibility.
**Associate Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law.
1. Conclusions which are simultaneously their own premises are: God, the
sense of right and wrong, and the "taken for granted reality." Neuhaus, Law and the
Rightness of Things, 14 VAL. U.L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Neuhaus].
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basis. This colorless and shallow view' of life's riches has been rightly
condemned. Jerome Frank, for example, terms it a "belated
scholasticism," a "medieval prepossession" in the most exaggerated
and persistent form.' Analyses such as Neuhaus' must take this
sense of professionalism into account, however, for it reflects fairly
accurately the ways in which actors perform their roles in legal
systems. More importantly, this aspect of professionalism also illustrates the ways in which complex social systems resist the reduction necessary to fit them into tidy analyses such as Neuhaus.'
While the lawyers' quest for absolute legal certainty (arguably an
aspect of the religious impulse at work in society) will never be
fulfilled, we are certainly entitled to ask of a theory that it seek
&precision in each class of things just as far as the nature of the subject admits."' Further, a theory is of little practical value if concrete
policy prescriptions cannot be derived from it in a fairly unambiguous fashion. This, I will argue, is an impossibility under the
Neuhaus lecture.
If I may be permitted a Biblical allusion, the lecture falls into
the trap of rendering unto God some of the things which are properly
Caesar's 5 I will argue that Neuhaus fails to take adequate account
of the role the state plays, for good or ill, in securing justice. More
2. See C. EISENMANN, THE UNIVERSITY TEACHING OF SOCIAL SCIENCE LAW 10
(1972); J. FARRAR, INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL METHOD 149, 170 (1970); M. FREEMAN, THE
LEGAL STRUCTURE 116-17 (1974); Riesman, Law and Sociology, in LAW AND SOCIOLOGY
12, 16-17 (W. Evan, ed. 1962); Shklar, Legalism, in INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 33,
34 (D. Lloyd, ed., 3d ed. 1972); Trubeck, Max Weber on Law and Capitalism, 1972 WIs.
L. REV. 720, 740.
3. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE M4ODERN MIND 63 (1930). While it is true that
lawyers are no mere mechanics, this does not necessarily mean that they exercise a
"quasi-priestly role" (Neuhaus at 8) unless this role is equated with a more general
one, the exercise of power. Many middle-level policy decisions fall to lawyers by
default because the technical requirements of, for example, legislative drafting, judicial
opinion writing and giving advice to businessmen force lawyers to make specific the
often fuzzy, wishful or even deliberately misleading thinking of other social scientists,
businessmen, politicians, etc. Lawyers do not often celebrate this power in public,
since it lacks both sanction (under, for example, the Constitution, corporate charters)
and popular accountability (to the electorate, shareholders, etc.).
4. Hutchins, Natural Law and Jurisprudence, in NATURAL LAW AND MODERN
SOCIETY 29, 33 (J. Cogley, ed. 1966) (quoting and applying Aristotle in an analogous circumstance). See J. FRANK, supra note 3, at 11, 194.
5. E.g., J. ELLUL, THE THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF LAW 13 (1969): "Christians also belong to an earthly nation, and are subject to this nation's law, which cannot be Christian law." Later in the same paragraph, Ellul shifts to what seems to be
Neuhaus' position: "Law is secular and is part of a secular world. But this is a world
where Jesus Christ is King." Id.
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fundamental, however, is Neuhaus' tendency toward what Garry
Willis terms an "intellectual imperialism,"' a readiness to claim for
theology any worthwhile insight gained outside of it for a different
purpose and after considerable effort. Neuhaus proceeds to drown
all of philosophy in a capacious theology, which then supplies all of
the nonlegal underpinnings of jurisprudence! He excoriates the
Legal Realists (among others), forgetting that many of them operate
pre-existing canons of values which are similar to Neuhaus' in effect
but derived from very different, primarily sociological, sources.
Realists have replied to this sort of barracking in kind and have called
for the Gotterdammerung.s These silly types of demarcation
disputes among disciplines generate more heat than light'-an unfortunate state of affairs for justice, which needs all the friends it
can get. Neuhaus seems to recognize the dangers of dispute, yet
many of his arguments tend to exacerbate tensions between
theologians and other friends of justice. To take the most subtle example offered by the lecture, his assertion that "[tihe exclusion of
living moral tradition from the public arena dates from the wars of
religion in the seventeenth century""0 explains too much. Can a
moral tradition be "living" if it has been excluded from the "public
6.

Willis, An Exercise in Apologetics, N.Y. Times, July 22, 1979, (Book

Review), at 6. Many of Willis' criticisms of

HANS KUNG, FREUD AND THE PROBLEM OF

GOD (1979) can be applied in pari materia to the Neuhaus lecture.
7. Religion is defined very broadly: it "may be ... Christianity or Buddhism,
or it may be a variation of religion, such as atheism, or it may be a political program
or humanitarian ideal or an aspiration to some excellence. It may be superficial or profound." Neuhaus at 2. Has Neuhaus left out any wellspring of endeavor? If so, it is
caught by even broader definitions of theology as the "disciplined application of critical
the disciplined reflection upon transcendent truth and
reason to the meaning of life [,]
value that give significance . . . to our lives." Id at 9. This would be commonly accepted as a definition of philosophy which is both broader and narrower than theology.
See, e.g., B. RUSSELL, HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 13 (1961). Nevertheless,
Neuhaus finds that"[p]ursued seriously enough ... the question of meaning is the question of God." Neuhaus at 9. It also becomes the jurisprudential question, for Neuhaus'
abstract, general and theoretical investigation attempts to lay bare the essential principles of law and legal systems. See, e.g., P. FITZGERALD, SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 1
(12th ed. 1966).
8. E.g., J. FRANK, supra note 3, at 198-99: "[Sbo far as the administration of
justice is concerned, there must be a twilight of the gods; ... law cannot function at
its best if it must still also do the work of religion."
9. See text accompanying note 26 infra. Recriminations between law and
theology since the Enlightenment are so intense precisely because they were once a
"happily-married couple."
10. Neuhaus at 12-13. See, e.g., id. at 13: "[T]here are many secularists in
this society who do most genuinely fear the church's ambitions to rule. Those fears
must be put to rest .. " Presumably, a bit of poetic license was used here, and fears
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arena" for three hundred years? Are the Revolution, the Fourteenth
Amendment, and arguments concerning abortion not based on "living moral tradition"?
NATURAL LAW

The "living moral tradition" forming the backbone of the lecture is most definitely natural law, and Neuhaus' failure to make
any reference to this concept is most peculiar. The most likely explanation is that the appellation "natural law," as opposed to the
diverse ideas it encapsules, is unpopular among theologians; among
Catholics since the Second Vatican Council, and among Protestants
since the eighteenth century, despite the qualified acceptance of
natural law concepts by Luther and Calvin." From a legal vantage
point, Neuhaus' arguments amount to nothing other than a theory of
natural law (an "ideology" in the eyes of many historians and
political scientists) because they fall within the core meaning of
commonly-accepted natural law definitions. His assertions reflect a
faith in a standard of values rather than logical demonstrations of
their content. Neuhaus expects these values, which may be
characterized as "imminent in existential facts and independent of
human will," to exercise a censorial power over positive laws." In
other words, Neuhaus, like natural lawyers, seeks to discover the
ultimate measure of right and wrong, the pattern of the good life in
the permanent underpinning of law and in its relation to justice.
There is certainly no shortage of these kinds of theories of justice,
and it is the abundance of contradictory solutions they offer that
of a more diffuse religious influence over public affairs are what is being discussed. No
one expects a modern nation-state to revert to the kinds of governmental organizations
of which churches seem capable, the Papal States or Calvin's Geneva. Many nonChristians examine carefully the stands taken by churches on secular issues, rather
than rejecting them out of hand because of their religious inspiration. See text accompanying notes 73-77 infra.
11. P. SIGMUND, NATURAL LAW IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 180 (1971). While secular
interest in natural law also flagged after the Enlightenment, a modest revival has occurred since World War I, as a result of declining socio-economic stability, the expansion of governmental activities an increased awareness of the limitations of empiricist
social science, and the kinds of motives that led to, for example, the adoption of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A natural law "tradition" is described in the
text because diverse speculations coexist uncomfortably under this generic label: as
"nine different meanings can be found attributed to 'nature' and no less a number of
meanings to 'law,' we have (without adding the meanings of the two words 'natural
law' as a single symbol) about eighty-one possible meanings." J. STONE, HUMAN LAW

213 (1965).
12. Id. at 76, 80, 213. See, A. D'ENTREVES,

AND HUMAN JUSTICE

E. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE 30, 333-34 (1953).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol14/iss1/3

NATURAL LAW

108-09 (2d ed. 1970);

Brietzke: The Rightness of the "Rightness of Things"
19791

THE "RIGHTNESS" OF NEUHA US

most limits the influence of natural law.18 Wittingly or not, Neuhaus'
analyses embody almost all of these contradictions without attempting to overcome them." An acute theoretical confusion results, and
the reconstruction of a coherent theory of justice based on the lecture becomes impossible.
Deriving an "Is" from an "Ought"
The distinction Neuhaus makes between concrete or positive
laws (lex, Io" Gesetz, Legge) and the abstract law (js8, droit, Recht,
diritto) is of considerable antiquity. The values underlying positive
laws can be ascertained with relative ease by studying the history
of legislation and the common law. But where are the values
underlying "The Law" to be found? Pastor Neuhaus flirts with
divine revelation as the source of "The Law" at several junctures,"
13. See A. D'ENTREVES, supra note 12, at 13-15; G. PATON, JURISPRUDENCE
94-113 (3d ed. 1969); E. SCHUR, LAW AND SOCIETY 51 (1968); P. STEIN & J. SHAND, LEGAL
VALUES IN WESTERN SOCIETY 8-9 (1974).
14. See text accompanying notes 16-44 infra.
15. Catholic doctrine by and large holds that natural law is discoverable from
the essential order of created nature. Catholicism finds the basis for this doctrine in
St. Paul's teaching that the unaided conscience could arrive at moral truths. This
teaching permitted the synthesis of Christian doctrine and non-Christian philosophy
by, for example, Aquinas. In contrast, many Protestant theologians (for example, Erik
Wolf) emphasize the insufficiency of man's reason and the weakness of will which
result from sin. Justice thus comes from God seizing man and making him just through
justifying mercy. For Karl Barth, for example, the Scriptures are a more certain
source of religious knowledge than reason. J. ELLUL, supra note 5, at 27; P. FITZGERALD, supra note 7, at 17; P. SIGMUND, supra note 11, at 181; J. STONE, supra note 11,
at 194, 214. For Julius Stone such "theories depend on a kind of theological anthropology and theological ethics, transmitted by revelation. . . . [Alcceptance of
revelation establishes the reality of natural law; but there is by the same token
nothing for discussion with anyone who rejects it." Id. at 195. Cf. J. Messner, The
PostwarNatural Law Revival and its Outcome, 4 NAT. L.F. 101, 104 (1959).
Compared to the conventional views of Protestant theologians, the position
Neuhaus announces is rather equivocal: "People distinguish between particular laws
and what they call 'the law.' It is the latter that partakes of a numinous, even a divine
character that, like religion, is binding." Neuhaus at 5 (emphasis supplied). Causal
links are not established among these assertions. Further, law and religion may both
be "binding," but the sources of their "bindingness" may be totally different. See text
accompanying notes 52-55 infra. Discussing his definition of law as a giving of expression to an "ultimate meaning," Neuhaus finds this same purpose in Christian theology:
it
works with the data of God's self-revelation in the life, death and resurrection, and promised return of Jesus whom we call the Christ. But there
are many ways of doing theology other than the Christian way.
And, again in Christian theology, the ultimate meaning of anything is to
be found in the end of that thing. [It- is revealed- if the Christian gospel
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but he moves off quickly to find a "sense" of right and wrong
embedded in "moral sentiments." These deeply humanistic concepts
stand in sharp contrast to the divine revelation that is "a kind of extreme positivism in which God plays God, instead of man playing
God."' 6 Neuhaus' theory of moral sentiments leaves unresolved two
of the major antinomies of philosophy: whether an objective or subjective ultimate meaning is to be found and whether it is sought
through intuition or exercises of intellect.
Arguing at the outset that positive law is but tenuously connected to life, Neuhaus nevertheless feels on safe ground while appealing for individuals to use their life experiences to bolster "The
Law."" Pastor Neuhaus is an attractive experiential "model," but I
am unable to forget Hume's brilliant demonstration that everything
we know can be stated without introducing the "self' that is nothing
but a bundle of perceptions (in the absence of divine revelation). The
intuitive sense of right and wrong Neuhaus relies on in others,
which seems to reach for the best result automatically, may be attractive precisely because it erects into a theory our inarticulateness about justice. The many things wrong with basing a
theory of justice on the secular experience of individuals are summarized by Iris Murdoch as "the self-assertive movements of a
deluded selfish will which because of our ignorance we take to be
autonomous."' 8
Pastor Neuhaus does admit that a few deviants will have ideas
of justice different from his, which he then attributes to us, 9 but he
seriously underestimates the range of opinion on the subject. Individuals differ widely in the amount of information available to
them, in cognitive and evaluative acumen and experience, in the
amount of time devoted to thinking about particular matters, and in

turns out to be true-in the End Time of the consumation of history in
the Messianic Age.
But now we are getting ahead of ourselves.
Neuhaus at 9 (emphasis supplied). The structure of this argument is one of fairly
strong assertions of divine revelation which are immediately qualified by an "if" and
the "buts." This syntax makes it difficult to determine the extent to which divine
revelation forms the basis of his "theory" of justice.
16. J. STONE, supra note 11, at 214.
17. Neuhaus at 1.
18. Quoted in R. DIAS, JURISPRUDENCE 74 (4th ed. 1976). See B. RUSSELL, supra
note 7, at 637; J. STONE, supra note 11, at 314.
19. See Neuhaus at 4; text accompanying notes 36-38 infra.
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perceptions of the implications of their feelings. All of us are influenced heavily by erratic and divergent patterns of culture and
language, both on an international scale and within the United
States. At the very least, Neuhaus should have qualified his appeal
to experience in terms of what we should desire if our impulses are
in harmony with reason.20 Even a localized version of the grand
moral consensus he seeks seems unlikely.
In a similar vein, Neuhaus' assertion of a free choice when giving "our yes or no to the moral sense that is the foundation of the
law"" stands rebutted by much of twentieth century social thought.
He stands on somewhat firmer ground here than elsewhere,
however; the positive law as we know it could never reject free will
in favor of determinism.' Even so, this does not mean that determinist arguments can be ignored when framing conceptions of "The
Law." Subjectively and intuitively, we live our lives as if free will
exists, as if we have something to say about what we are doing.
Much of modern psychology demonstrates, albeit imperfectly, that
what we see as voluntary choices are no more than conscious rationalizations of unconscious choices. Most of the values and assump20. See M. GINSBERG, ON JUSTICE IN SOCIETY 19 (1965); J. STONE, supra note
11, at 320; Barton and Mendlovitz, The Experience of Injustice as a Research Problem,
13 J. LEGAL EDUC. 24, 25 (1960); Knight, On the Meaning of Justice, in NoMos VI:
JUSTICE 1, 11-12 (C. Friedrich and J. Chapman, eds. 1963). Knight contrasts "erratic"
cultures with the biological evolution that produced a "practically uniform" human
species. Id.
21. Neuhaus at 5. While free will is at "the center of any life worth
living," i& at 2, critical judgments based on the exercise of a free will may have little practical effect: "We can withhold our subjective acknowledgement or assent from
the reality to which our moral sense points, but we cannot, without abandoning the
world of reasonable discourse, refuse to recognize the empirical fact of the law as it
makes its appearance in every society." Id. at 5. Presumably, some distinction is intended between this "reality" and a "prevenient reality." Id. The latter is a decidedly
ambiguous concept (see, e.g., note 52 infra): in 2 SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
1666 (1975), "prevenient" is defined as "coming before," "anticipatory" and "expectant,"
as well as "the grace of God which precedes repentance and conversion, predisposing
the heart to seek God." The latter I take to be the meaning of Neuhaus' (arguably
redundant) "prevenient grace." Id at 2. Is "prevenient reality" a theologian's pun?
22. Much of modern law, contracts, tort and criminal law in particular, could
not exist if we were unable to infer a free choice (for example, intention) from certain
acts, in the absence of insanity, duress, etc. Injustice is felt where penalties are imposed
in the absence of fault; public opinion favors strict liability only in those areas where
moral condemnation is not an issue. The "natural" rights of Englishmen, stemming
from transactions involving the exercise of free will, have been embodied in the U.S.
Constitution. See Alphacell Ltd. v. Woodward [1972] 2. All E. R. 475, 483 (per
Dilhorne, Vct.); P. STEIN & J. SHAND, supra note 13, at 130-33; Diamond, With Malice
Aforethought, in A SOURCEBOOK OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF AFRICA 10, 11 (R. Seidman,
ed. 1966).
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tions on which our choices are based have been internalized prior to
our reaching the age of intellectual consent. Freudians and many
neo-Freudians view individual judgments as influenced heavily by
instincts which are incompatible with the requirements of civilized
life. Many sociologists have discovered large numbers of what they
term alienated and anomic individuals, whose anxiety, isolation and
purposelessness prevent them from making rational judgments
about right and wrong. Building on these arguments, Sartre writes
of the fundamental absurdity in recognizing the necessity for moral
commitment while knowing that such a commitment is
meaningless. 3
The possibility of a coherent moral consensus thus approaches
the vanishing point under contemporary theories of psychology and
sociology. Organized religion has played and will continue to play a
major role in the formation of attitudes, in giving life meaning and
in reducing anomie and alienation. Neuhaus does not emphasize
these religious influences, however. He merely terms the kinds of
theories "reductionist and finally trivializing" 2 -precisely
the
criticisms that can be levelled against his lecture. For example, he
trivializes "psychological and other" explanations of "The Law" as
"a residual 'father image' or the after-glow of traumatic punishment
experienced during potty training."25 Those who would disagree
with Neuhaus (Freud, Robert Merton, Sartre, Hans Kelsen, Bentham, et al.) are variously labelled "handicapped," solipsistic sophomores, and individuals with deplorable personal deficiencies subject
to "poverty, if not perversity, of mind."2 This kind of name-calling
detracts from rather than adds to the weight of argument and constitutes the least attractive aspect of the lecture.
Individuals in a Moral Universe
Isolated individuals must obviously be brought together before
their beliefs can have much of an impact on justice, yet the ways in
23. R. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 162 (1957); Seeman, On
the Meaning of Alienation, in SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 510, 515 (L. Coser & B. Rosenberg
eds. 1969); P. SIGMUND, supra note 11, at 212. See Brietzke, The Chilobwe Murders
Trial, 17 AFR. STUDS. REV. 361, 369-70 (1974); Markse, Kofran & Vago, The Significance
of Natural Law in ContemporaryLegal Thought, 24 CATH. LAW. 60, 74 (1978). See also
Knight, supra note 20, at 18: "Human limitations and subservience to habit assure that
what is must always be the main content of what ought to be-despite all complaint
and grumbling."
24. Neuhaus at 4.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 3, 5. Arguably, the dean of Legal Realists-Jerome Frank-would
agree with these assertions.
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which Neuhaus assembles them pose all but insuperable difficulties.
Somehow a very firm bridge has to be built between the moral experience that is essentially a matter for the individual and the legal
experience that exists only within society and which purports to
pursue the common wealY The picture Neuhaus initially conveys of
litigious individuals who, for example, increasingly subject the "intimacies of marriage" to "the calculus of contract," 8 is not flattering
and tends to negate the existence of the moral consensus he subsequently discovers. On these matters he takes law too seriously; a
more relevant and useful description (devised by legal sociologists
and Realists, whom he disdains) is that law is but one of the
background assumptions which generate mutual expectations. When
law comes to the fore, it is as an effect rather than a cause of
dispute. The "proximate" cause of the re-emergence of marriagerelated contracts, for example, is the collapse of the sanctity of marriage among some groups, a contemporary theological concern which
illustrates an erosion of the bindingness of some of the moral obligations on which Neuhaus relies." The increase in American litigiousness'-high in comparison with that of the English but comparable to that of, for example, the Germans-is likewise the effect,
not the cause, of increased social conflict. Once again, we must not
exaggerate the influence of law on American society; at most law
serves to move delicately balanced matters off dead center." While
the individualism of the disputes underlying much of American
litigation may be a good thing from the standpoint of social stability,
it nevertheless reflects a dissensus concerning distributional issues:
who is to get what, when, where and how. Although Neuhaus largely
ignores them, the distributive aspects of justice are of primary concern to most Americans. It is at the pressure points in the distributional process, the junctures at which litigation most often occurs,
that convincing appeals to a sense of right and wrong have their
greatest effect.2
27. See Del Vecchio, cited in A. D'ENTRIEVES. supra note 12, at 84.
28. Neuhaus at 1.
29. Id. at 2.
30. The increase in American litigation has lagged behind population increases and the growth in the potential reach of the law, largely because litigation has
always been expensive relative to prevailing incomes. Friedman, Law, Order and
History, 16 S. D. L. REV. 242, 253 (1971).
31.

J.W. HURST LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES 80 (1977).

Cf. MacNeil, Contracts, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 854, 891 (1978): "The sources and dynamics
of social change almost always originated in experience outside the law."
32. There is of course a considerable overlap in individual attitudes here
(especially in light of the homogenizing effect of contemporary media), and organized
social life is impossible without at least a modicum of a localized consensus. Almost by
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An examination of the two major examples Neuhaus offers on
this topic is relegated to a footnote" because I hope to have shown
by now that his conception of justice assumes a consensus that is
definition, however, the individuals' sense of right and wrong is only appealed to
where differences of opinion exist. Taking the goals of liberty and equality-over
which so much American ink has been expended-into account, is it "right" or
"wrong" to, for example, use public funds to finance the abortions of the poor?
Reasonable minds can differ because they do differ. Such examples could be multiplied
endlessly, and it is difficult to see how, in the absence of divine revelation, a communal
sense of right and wrong based on appeals to individual experience can be anything
more than a weighted index of these contradictory attitudes. See text accompanying
notes 39 and 72 infra.
33. Neuhaus at 4-5, draws a parallel between someone who would "explain
away" moral sentiments (the "experience of having offended" against the law) and the
"person who insists my experience of a Mozart piano sonata is not an encounter with
beauty but with a neuro-chemical response to physical vibrations ..
" Setting aside
the bubble-like fragility of this analogy (and the fact that Pastor Neuhaus and I do
agree on one thing-Mozart), how can Neuhaus conclude that his rhetorical critic
displays a "poverty, if not perversity, of mind"? Id. The experience of beauty is
arguably no less subjective than that of justice and, to judge from record sales, radio
station programming, etc., Mozart's is definitely a beauty for a tiny minority in the
United States. We might term this group intellectuals of pretense or substance, or
precisely the group to whom Neuhaus' elegantly-phrased, sonata-form arguments
would appeal. He does make a plea for less elitist "worldviews" at the conclusion of
the lecture. Id. at 11-12; see also text accompanying notes 62-63 infra. However it is difficult to see how his lecture could form the basis for them.
Even more interesting is Neuhaus' proof that we offend against the Law when
we break a law, based on Berman's "all embracing moral reality [see note 21 supral, a
purpose in the universe, which stealing offends." Neuhaus at 2. True it is that all
societies acknowledge the concept of ownership; they diverge widely when we examine
the kinds -of subject matter to which ownership attaches, however. The major means of
production cannot be privately owned in communist party states, and many thefts
become offenses against the state that hardly amounts to Berman's "purpose in the
universe." In a few "primitive" societies, individuals may only own privacy (some
would not consider this a proprietary right) and their own name. When the U.S. income tax was first introduced, it was widely deemed a taking without consent; today,
it is accepted widely. As "a purpose in the universe," then, the prohibition of stealing
becomes so general as to be both meaningless and dangerous. Using the kind of
reasoning Berman adopts, any particular law or concept (for example, Charles Reich's
,new property") can be assimilated into universal law, particularly as state actions influence individual perceptions of right and wrong. The ease with which this can happen is illustrated by the ways in which Giorgio Del Vecchio accommodated the laws of
Fascist Italy within his libertarian theory of justice. Similar things could happen to
Neuhaus' arguments in less scrupulous hands for, as we shall argue, they have a close
affinity to Del Vecchio's. See text accompanying note 57 infra. See W. FRIEDMANN,
LEGAL THEORY 188-89 (5th ed. 1967); Honore, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 107 (A. Guest, ed. 1961); Mead, Some Anthropological Considerations
Concerning Natural Law, in INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 144, 146 (D. Lloyd, ed., 3d
ed. 1972).
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broader and deeper than the one attainable in this, or any other,"
worldly society. It is more accurate to speak of individuals sharing a
sense of injustice rather than of justice: personal confrontation with
certain conditions all but universally provokes anger where an
established serial order of entitlements is not respected or the serial
order is clearly irrelevant. Only an exceedingly incomplete sense of
justice can be derived from these subjective judgments reached in
the heat of anger. Injustice is only a particular instance in which a
wider justice is not achieved.'
Presumably one of Pastor Neuhaus' responses to my criticisms
would be that he has succeeded in linking, in a "relational" way, the
changing and localized moral sentiments of individuals with an immutable, a priori rightness and wrongness. He argues that the bond
or obligation we affirm, or want to affirm "is not at our disposal;...
it is prior to our being possessed by it; to it we hold ourselves accountable because to it we are accountable." This "prevenient reality" is an instance of "seeing what we had not seen before but had
been there all along . ..[,the] 'taken for granted reality' without
which the world is inexplicable." The "sense of right and wrong
turns out to be the premise of all other meanings." It is "inseparably
connected to an awareness of prevenient obligation, whether or not
expressed in explicitly religious terms." 6 The overall tenor of
34. It is difficult to ascertain the putative reach of Neuhaus' arguments. While
he frequently uses what are universals ex facie and, at other junctures, speaks in
terms of justice in Western societies, we find out near the end of the lecture that we
are contemplating "this society's sense of right and wrong." Neuhaus at 12. Thus, in
order to be fair, I have evaluated the lecture with reference to America's experiences;
there would be little sympathy abroad for the individualistic thrust of his arguments.
35. See E. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE 13-28, 136 (1949); De Jouvenal,
Sovereignty, in INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 377 (D. Lloyd ed., 3d ed. 1972); Barton
& Mendlovitz, supra note 20; P. STEIN & J. SHAND, supra note 13 at 59; J. STONE,
supra note 11, at 316.
36. Neuhaus at 2, 3, 5, 6 (emphasis supplied). See id. at 7; Markse, et al., supra
note 23, at 62. On the weaknesses of this line of reasoning, see note 21 supra; text accompanying note 1 supra.
The ways in which Neuhaus links individual sentiments with immutable sentiments may amount to a natural law with a "changing content." Basic principles remain constant but their detailed application depends on the circumstances of time and
place: for example, slavery was permissible in ancient Greece but not in 20th century
America. If this is what Neuhaus intends, the basic principles are never delineated
adequately and the relevant social differences may be congruent with difference in individual moral sentiments. See P. FITZGERALD, supra note 7, at 21.
Further, immutable a priori premises can only lead to conclusions of the same
type; the exercises in logic which Neuhaus offers thus have little practical bearing on
the predetermined outcome of his arguments. I am unable to resist the temptation to
add a "joke" concerning what "had been there all along" and about a philosopher, a
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his arguments suggests that Pastor Neuhaus' immutable a priori
premises stem from an empirical source: his personal sense of right
and wrong. 7 We are thus stuck between a philosophical rock and a
hard place. On the one hand, Pastor Neuhaus' subjectivities masquerade as an objective "moral police" inclined to "invest mere likes
and dislikes with the authority of moral law"" to overcome rival
moral judgments. On the other hand, the rejection of objective truth
has the effect of making "the majority for practical purposes
...the arbiters of what to believe." 9
The immutability and objectivity claimed for Neuhaus' "prevenient reality" is quickly watered down by linking it to the sentiments of individuals through the subjective and evanescent byproducts of relational experiences: gratitude, resentment, shame and
guilt.'" These are, by definition, the products of faith or intuition
rather than the intellect. Shame and guilt are futile feelings" commonly cited as evidence of psychological maladjustment when they
appear in excess. Neuhaus ignores many significant relations and
relational experiences. 2 For example, the notion of corrective justice
is based on a relational history among individuals and groups, a
history of injuries and inequalities which forms the basis for compeltheologian and a lawyer. The philosopher enters a coal shed at midnight, looking for a
black cat he believes does not exist. He doesn't find it, nor does the theologian who
believes, however, that the cat is there. The lawyer goes into the coal shed, extracts
two black cats he has concealed in his coat pockets and emerges triumphantly to face a
press conference.
37. See text accompanying notes 18-21, 23-26 infra.
38. M. GINSBERG, supra note 20, at 227, quoting J.S. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY (W. Ashley ed. 1909).
39. B. RUSSELL, supra note 7, at 94. This majoritarian approach has been
repudiated in part for America by the First Amendment. See note 32 supra; text accompanying note 72 infra.
40. Neuhaus at 3-4. These moral sentiments "are inherently relational. That
is, they do not exist in a vacuum; the experience is related to someone or something
beyond itself.... It is ... related to something that is religious, having to do with the
religare, with a network of bindingness of which our obligations are part." Id. at 4.
41. "No good has ever come from feeling guilty.... The guilty do not pay attention to the object but only to themselves, and not even to their own interests,
which might make sense, but to their anxieties." Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, in ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW 2, 8 (B. Ackerman ed. 1975)(quoting
Paul Goodman).
42. E.g., the "intercorporate mode of doing business," the many interventions
of government, and the development of closed, well-to-do residential communities.
MacNeil, The Many Futures of Contract, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691, 694-95 (1974). MacNeil
offers interesting analyses of the legal implications of relational experiences in id.,
passim.
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ling claims to redress.'8 Those relations which generate the experiences Neuhaus does discuss, family relations for example, have
been in a constant state of flux since about World War I. In sum,
Neuhaus' natural law asks us to base our notions of justice on a
murky higher reality we are allowed to see but dimly through our
artificially truncated relational experiences." His method of pursuing justice requires more than acts of faith; it requires us to
repudiate reason. As such it could hardly fulfill the role Neuhaus
gives it as a tool of critical reason.
Justice and History
Lest my evaluation of Neuhaus' natural law appear to be entirely negative, let me add that while much of his analysis is rooted
too firmly in the America of 1979, he also gives the broad historical
sweep of the pursuit of justice a valuable emphasis. This is a needed
corrective to theories such as Rawls' and to the preoccupations of
American lawyers, who have little interest in legal history or in
legal systems other than their own. The dynamic and contingent
elements revealed by a historical perspective do, however, convert
his a priori immutable ideal of justice into a loose approximation of
that which a particular society is capable at a given stage of development. The meaning of justice changes over time and the ways
in which it is sought changes its meaning; gone is the possibility of a
mechanical Categorical Imperative which grinds out the correct result after a penny's worth of general principles is inserted.'
Pastor Neuhaus uses his historical perspectives to sketch a developmental" theory of justice, invoking "the 'oughtness' of things
43. F. Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic Theory of Law,
62 MINN. L. REV. 1015, 1023-25 (1978).
44. J. ELLUL, supra note 5, at 26, comments on the "inconsistency" from the
theological viewpoint of "believing in, while not being able to define, a common principle."
45. See, e.g., Neuhaus at 11; E. BODENHEIMER, TREATISE ON JUSTICE 261
(1967); Cogley, Introduction, in NATURAL LAW AND MODERN SOCIETY. supra note 4, at
17-18; J. FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 3 (1973) (quoting John Leonard); C. FRIEDRICH,
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 242 (2d ed. 1963).
46. A development model
does not purport to describe a particular sequence of events or to predict
a specific future. Rather, it is a theory of institutional constraint and
response whose intellectual function is to identify potentials for change in
a specific range of situations. Although the model may . . . roughly approximate the broad sweep of history, this is not the main point .... [The
model] is helpful if it successfully identifies characteristic stresses, problems, opportunities, expectations and emergent adaptations. ...
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in order to bring the 'isness' of things under judgment." He finds
that the "anticipatory" quality of law is such that "the 'now' is at
best only a preview of the promised 'not yet'.""" This is a noble attempt at bridging the chasm between fact and value that has bedevilled law and the other social sciences ever since David Hume
and a subsequent empiricist tradition raised it to a first principle.
Unless what "is" can be evaluated in terms of what "ought" to be,
critical theories of justice remain impossible. We can determine
whether a particular result is efficient (in the economist's sense) but
not if it is good or just." Law is a particularly useful means of syn[Platterns [of social change] involve both disorganization and
reorganization, the attenuation of the old and the emergence of the new.
They are developmental, however, in that some states or stages are
assumed to be "prior" to others, often in time, but more significantly in
importance and function ...
A key function of developmental models . . . is to help diagnose the
capacities and weaknesses of institutions, and assess their potentials for
the realization of values.
P. NONET & P. SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION 23-25 (1978) (emphasis supplied).
47. Neuhaus at 7, 11.
48. Whether true or false, Hume's skepticism arguably illustrates the
bankruptcy of eighteenth century reasonableness. In any event, he cheerfully ignored
his own precepts when writing about social problems like any other enlightened
moralist of his time.
At the very least, values such as honesty, integrity, judiciousness, caution and
conscientiousness are a necessary part of any worthwhile scientific (or social science)
inquiry. Even in the natural sciences, rigid is/ought distinctions cannot be maintained:
values (including maximizing the profits of research institutes) determine what is
studied, how scientific resources are allocated and which ideas attract the commitment
of the scientific community. In this sense, science is less scientific than Neuhaus seems
to assume. In any event, to equate social "science" with natural "science" is to illustrate the logical fallacy of the ambiguous middle.
Lawyers cannot repeat experiments to verify hypotheses, and the principles
they create decide cases-while scientific "cases" are part of the material from which a
scientific principle is drawn. Legal principles change in response to changed moral or
policy considerations, as well as to perceived changes in fact situations. Lawyers
reason by analogy and choose from among competing analogies, while scientists cannot
use analogies. Among jurists, only a portion of the analytical positivists aim at a
"scientific" jurisprudence, and these persons are immune to any form of natural law
argument anyway.
Social life is too complex and too vulnerable to human and environmental forces
for social science analyses to be as precise as those of the natural sciences. To
eliminate value judgments is, in any event, to eliminate social science: since it studies
human behavior, social science must be concerned with the value judgments people
make. Black people know racism to be cruel and the unemployed view the economy as
harsh and unjust. This knowledge affects their actions and the thought and actions of
others, but not necessarily in the ways Neuhaus suggests. This knowledge must thus
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thesizing "is" and "ought" over time. For, as Jerome Hall notes,
"the value and the factuality of law coalesce in the specified ongoing
condition as it moves toward its goal.""' On this view, whether or
not society circumvents or stops short of achieving justice-a concrete but frequently reformulated "ought," chosen carefully from
among many other "oughts"-depends on the pull of the "ought"
against the inertia of fact, the "is." Ideally, a developmental theory
would also incorporate a pragmatic evaluation; the "can," of the
social, political and economic resources (broadly defined) available to
be mobilized to achieve justice in a particular place and time. As
soon as a society moves beyond subsistence, distributional issues
begin to revolve around socially-as opposed to biologically - determined needs and desires. Things and rights which almost everyone
else has become a psychological necessity for the underprivileged in
their battle to escape degradation."
While much of history is apparently indifferent to any pattern
of right and wrong, law and morality are becoming increasingly interdependent in the West. Legal changes rely increasingly on
legislative fact-finding inquiries and on conceptions of well-being and
the other purposes law (and American legal education) "ought" to
advance. Whether law does as much as it "can," given America's
level of development, is a very different matter which is beyond the
scope of this comment. As it is I have gone far beyond Neuhaus' formulations to outline a process characterized by tension and conflict
rather than the consensus he assumes. Instead of constituting a
"prevenient reality," competing values are in a constant state of
be incorporated into social science analyses; the only danger is that it will displace
rather than complement careful observations of what actually happens.
See R. DIAS, supra note 18, at 208; L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM 149 (1975);
C. FRIEDRICH, supra note 45, at 7, 172; Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,
in INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 25 (D. Lloyd ed., 3d ed. 1973); Neuhaus at 6, 7, 8; J.
ROBINSON, FREEDOM AND NECESSITY 122 (1970); B. RUSSELL, supra note 7, at 645-46;
Selznick, Sociology and Natural Law, in THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF LAW 16, 18 (D.
Black and M. Mileski, eds. 1973); J. STONE, supra note 11, at 220; L. WARSHAY, THE
CURRENT STATE OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 157 (1975).
49. J. HALL, COMPARATIVE LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 82-83 (1963). See J. ROBINSON, supra note 48, at 123; Selznick, supra note 48, at 19; E. SCHUR, supra note 13, at
202: "The legal system is at once an embodiment of high ideals and a means by which
men can deal with the quite mundane and often messy problems that arise in everyday
living." Cf. P. STEIN and J. SHAND, supra note 13, at 258 (quoting Neil MacCormick):
"[Pirinciples express the underlying purposes of detailed rules and specific institutions,
in the sense that they are seen as rationalizing them in terms of consistent, coherent
and desirable goals. Thus legal principles are the meeting point of rules and values."
50. See Grey, Property and Need, 28 STAN. L. REV. 877, 898 (1976).
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possibly becoming a reality in American society. Formulations of
these values should be based on past experiences and serve to anticipate the future as well; there is no hard evidence that ours is the
acme of civilization. While Neuhaus tends to overemphasize present
experience, he also takes a more dynamic view of justice than is
found in the older theories of law and theology, with their emphasis
on a minimum of change and a maximum of static perfection. Finally
Neuhaus neglects the fact that it is through political processes that
fact and value have intermingled throughout history." Having, as
Neuhaus might argue, smuggled the state into my evaluations, I will
move on to explore his other major theme.
LEGITIMATION CRISIS

Neuhaus considers a vital issue at various junctures in the lecture: Crises in government legitimacy, if they are not resolved, may
result in fundamental changes in government and in life as we know
it. Given the temper of the times, many writers on public affairs are
addressing this problem. Compared to the best of their work,
Neuhaus' descriptions and solutions are not particularly perceptive.
He takes an overly-legalistic view of the problem and arguably
mystifies the "awe and majesty" of law that turns out to have
nonmetaphysical and rather mundane origins. He equates religion
with laws we are bound to acknowledge. This equation can exist only
at a very high level of generality, for law and religion have very different sources of bindingness and acknowledgement. A life without
freely-accepted obligations may be unpleasant but, contra Neuhaus,
it is not necessarily "in bondage to chaos." Chaos is contained
through obligations imposed by individuals, groups and the State.
At best life is a compound of freedom and necessity."
51. Cf. G. DEL VECCHIO, JUSTICE 155 (A. Campbell ed. 1953) on "the historical
life of the law." "Like Saturn in the old fable, our consciousness seems to devour its
own children. Having produced solutions to the problem of justice, it straight-away
finds in them argument to restate the problem as against themselves, seeking further
and independent solutions." Del Vecchio then goes down a Hegelian road which most
American lawyers would not travel: "law is the object of a qualitative progress of
phenomena from mere formless matter to progressive organization and individualization. The aim is perfect autonomy of the spirit." Id. W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 33, at
188. His principles of justice are not merely evaluative; they are bound to realize
themselves in history, ultimately through a universal world law.
52. See Neuhaus at 2, 5-6, 9; J. ROBINSON, supra note 48. Neuhaus argues
"that the origins and sustaining force of law are indeed obscure and mysterious. There
is nothing more unrealistic ... than the proposal that laws are created or obeyed apart
from a communal consensus of what is right and wrong . . .inseparably connected to
an awareness of prevenient obligation...." Neuhaus at 6.
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The Causes of Crises
Neuhaus does not define the contentious concept of legitimacy,
which I take to denote a faith or trust in law and individuals,
organizations and procedures sufficient to make claims to obedience
seem self-evident. To the extent that these claims seem self-evident,
fewer of the resources used to secure compliance need be deployed.
These resources, which are both a cause and effect of legitimacy
over time, include: law, of course; revolution, the Constitutional Convention for example; charisma, Washington as the Father of his
Country; political leadership, Roosevelt during the Depression and
the War; the approved exercise of discretion fettered but loosely by
law, the Manhattan Project; ideology, anything plausibly defined as
part of The American Way during the 1950s; coercion, federal troops
implementing Southern school integration; and public participation
in decision-making, community-level minority programs during the
1960s and 1970s. Neuhaus' bald assertion, "if law is not also a moral
enterprise, it is without legitimacy or binding force,"' ignores the
sources of legitimacy I have listed and many others too. My list,
such as it is, enables us to focus more precisely on the causes of contemporary legitimation crises: the resources which bolster
legitimacy are manifestly in short supply, in large part because they
have been foolishly dissipated by incompetent politicians and
bureaucrats. Consider for example the Vietnam War and the energy
"war."" Vast amounts of human, political and economic resources
are squandered in largely futile attempts to convince the public of
the existence of crises deemed self-evident by Presidents and
bureaucrats. As a consequence, the goodwill on which every regime
hopes to trade is dissipated.
While Neuhaus adopts the fundamental assumption that we are
a nation of laws and not men, most Americans have little cause to
make this distinction. The authority of the law is seen to be linked
closely to the authority of those who make and apply it. If they are
perceived as immoral, incompetent or not popularly accountable
(e.g., the Warren Court), the authority of the law suffers accordingly.
Immorality is the only one of these three criteria addressed by
Neuhaus' line of reasoning leads me to conclude that "prevenient obligation" is
"obscure and mysterious"-a conclusion abundantly confirmed by other arguments deployed by Neuhaus. See, e.g., note 21 supra.
53. Id at 8. See W. LAQUEUR, A CONTINENT ASTRAY: EUROPE 1970-1978
(1979).
54. See Odell, World Energy and the Significance of non-OPEC Oil, Manchester Guardian Weekly, Sept. 2, 1979, at 9.
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Neuhaus, and then only in a cosmic sense, which for example, ignores the venality of politicians and bureaucrats. As Neuhaus
argues, citizens like to see their affairs handled in a moral fashion.
But the public seeks more: decisions which are quick, precise,
mechanical and objective. Most Americans balance rationally the
sometimes irrationally-perceived losses-privacy, free enterprise,
etc.-and gains from contacts with various levels of government.
Many of these contacts are not directly regulated under law; in
Chicago, Mayor Richard Daley's political machine merely made blatant what often remains latent in much of governmental activity. If
people feel themselves to have gained on balance from government,
they will take care to avoid endangering the overall system while
grumbling about and seeking to change particular outcomes.
Another aspect of the legitimation crisis, then, is that greater
numbers of people now find themselves holding the short end of the
government stick. If Pastor Neuhaus' sense of right and wrong has
anything to do with contemporary delegitimating processes, it is as
an exceedingly pragmatic and self-interested right and wrong.
The connections between his two major themes, legitimation
crises and the impact of the moral sentiments of individuals, are left
obscured by Neuhaus. His phrase "however much our ideas may be
'
socially constructed and conditioned'M
leaves the most important
question unanswered: to what precise extent are they socially conditioned? His assertion that "law is preeminently a social
phenomenon"" is a truism. The only guidance we received is a brief
statement to the effect that law is by definition "trans-subjective"-a rubric adopted in Giorgio Del Vecchio's theory of justice,
which is similar to Neuhaus'. 7 While Neuhaus does take limited account of the state's role in promoting justice and legitimacy, smaller
groupings such as the NAACP or the Sierra Club are totally ignored-as they are in Roscoe Pound's theory of justice, for example.
Each group has a moral sense which is both different in kind from
55.

Neuhaus at 5.

56.

Id.

57. Id. In a Kantian and Hegelian vein Del Vecchio held that man as an intelligent being comprehends and even transcends nature. Each of us possesses the
"eternal seed of justice," which is both idea and sentiment or what I have termed the
admixture of intellect and intuition used by Neuhaus. The essence of Del Vecchio's
justice is "inter-subjectivity;" the simultaneous consideration of several subjects on the
same plane. Friedmann, supra note 33, at 186-88. Such a process requires that individuality be overcome through a "projection of the ego in form of the alter, the
subordination of self to a trans-subjective standard." G. DEL VECCHIO, supra note 51, at
158 (emphasis supplied).
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that of individual members and greater than the sum of its parts.
The latter is a major reason for organizing the group in the first
place, to make more effective the pursuit of members' interests
through the pluralistic political bargaining" that, for good or ill,
molds the face of American justice. Fierce competition among singleissue pressure groups can cause democracy to give way to the kind
of syndicalism that paved the way for Italian and Spanish Fascism.
This is presumably the kind of change in government that worries
Neuhaus. Without assistance from independent groups, on the other
hand, the individual is deprived of much fellowship and stands naked
in front of the state-one of the preconditions to authoritarianism.
In the West, the law takes a formally cool but neutral approach to
most groups,69 ignoring their potential roles in securing genuine participatory democracy, legitimacy and justice. It is surprising that
Neuhaus should also ignore this potential, for he has a laudable
reputation as a participant in group struggles for social justice.
In Moral Man and Immoral Society," Niebuhr effectively
rebuts the position taken by Neuhaus and many others, that a society
and its state can live up to the sense of right and wrong applied to
individuals. Niebuhr argues that, while the lesser of two evils will
often be chosen by a state, it remains an evil nonetheless. From this
vantage point, the application of principles of justice becomes as
problematic as the application of precedents supplemented by the
juries and courts of equity that occasionally attempt to do justice,
beyond the point to which law can be stretched. This kind of imperfect pliability, encompassing the having and sharing of purposes
and experiences, makes the concept of the Western liberal
democratic state the best worldly approximation of the religious and
philosophical ideal Neuhaus seeks. This concept of the state encompasses the essence of the old idea of reason without its elitist rationalism. 1 Contra Neuhaus, the legitimation crises he describes are
those of an all-too-imperfect realization of such a state, rather than
58. See Friedman, supra note 30, at 186-88.
59. J. STEIN & P. SHAND, supra note 13, at 52. The idea derives originally
from Aquinas: see, e.g., J. STONE, supra note 11, at 52. See also B. RUSSELL, supra note
7, at 189: "It is impossible to organize an orchestra on the principle of giving to each
man what would be best for him as an isolated individual. The same sort of thing applies to the government of a large modern state, however democratic."
60.

R. NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN IN IMMORAL SOCIETY: A STUDY IN ETHICS AND

POLITICS (1932).
61. See C. FRIEDRICH, MAN AND HIS GOVERNMENT 38-40 (1963); Neuhaus at
7; P. SIGMUND, supra note 11, at 181-2 (quoting Reinhold Niebuhr); J. STONE, supra
note 11, at 328 (quoting Sir Patrick Devlin).
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crises of law per se. American and Western European governments
lack the political leadership and administrative capacities needed to
cope with the near-collapse of many non-governmental sources of
authority, which hitherto helped to legitimate governmental activities. Most significant in this respect is the erosion of the practical recognition accorded laissez faire and the declining influence of
what John Dewey termed the "cultural matrix" of authority. This
declining influence bodes ill for Neuhaus' theories, since the
"matrix" is composed of the parents, schools and churches that form
the basis of Neuhaus' "relational experiences." When individuals and
groups no longer act as though they believe in laissez faire, each
economic crisis is rapidly and inevitably transferred to the political
arena where government is seen to be paralyzed once again under
the pressure of events it cannot control. A major cause and effect of
these legitimation crises is that much of the economic individualism
that characterized nineteenth century America has disappeared:
political and economic systems based on private property have been
administration of a quasi-public
transformed into the unlegitimated
62
power by large corporations.
The Cures for Crises
Neuhaus adverts to these kinds of issues while discussing an
ill-defined "cultural crisis." If the "worldviews" he mentions but
does not describe are as "popularly accessible" and ''vibrant" as he
suggests," they could hardly be excluded from the public arena. The
marketplace of ideas is fairly efficient. This can easily be
demonstrated if a broader geographical perspective than Neuhaus'
is adopted: consider the influence of such "worldviews" as Christian
62. See C. DE HOUGHTON, THE COMPANY 132 (1970); J. HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (1976); E. PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 149 (quotingJohn Dewey); P. STEIN
& J. SHAND, supra note 13, at 119. Cf. Samuels, The Economy as a System of Power
and its Legal Bases, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 261, 300 (1973) (quoting Robert Lee Hale):
laissez faire is "government by businessmen .... The progressive rejection of this
governance casts additional burdens on public governments. Id. See also Friedman,
supra note 30, at 245:
This revolt [against authority] . . . is a more or less natural or logical
result of instrumental attitudes about government, power and law. Traditional props of authority have worn away. [Individuals and groups] feel
entitled to use every instrument of power that is at hand, and to reach
out for those that are not. Our ideology, in many ways, leaves us
defenseless against erosion of authority. [If every group did reach out for
power, if no group remained satisfied with a subordinate position, the
level of social tension and turmoil was bound to escalate ..
63. Neuhaus at 12.
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democracy, social democracy, Leninism and Castroism. The main
"worldview" Neuhaus considers (and properly rejects) is that of
John Rawls, whose theory of justice led Kenneth Boulding to
observe that "the discourse of philosophers is like the stars; it sheds
so little light because it is so high."" I would also apply this
criticism to Neuhaus lecture; at the very least, it fails his own accessibility/vibrancy test by directing its appeal primarily to intellectuals (although his audience should feel flattered).
Legitimacy has been a rebuttable presumption in the West
ever since Aquinas provided the tools by which it could be rebutted.
Politicians have long attempted to maintain and bolster their
legitimacy through discursive justification, pragmatic politics, canny
political manipulation, coercion and terror. A realistic theory of
justice and/or legitimacy must take account of all these tactics. An
unjust state is still a state, the essence of a state being power. Even
so, a state cannot maintain itself in the long run if it persistently ignores claims to justice. The positive side of this coin is that it encourages the daily exercise of power in ways designed to legitimate
power; order must be maintained, of course, but it must also be a
good order which is prompted by fears for the regime's future and
the consequent need to win support for good government. This is
yet another link between the "is" and the "ought," described as subsisting between arbitrary commands and rational authority by
Jerome Hall and between efficacy and morality by Lord Lloyd. The
negative aspect of the interdependence of justice and legitimacy is
that (the unlamented "Emperor" Bokassa and Idi Amin excepted)
even despots know better than to display a consistent caprice. They
lack the power to do other than permit broad areas of individual
freedom, and they cloak arbitrariness in regularized forms of law
and administration." This tendency for essences to diverge from appearances in a seemingly random fashion makes fiendishly difficult
the practical application of the critical reason Neuhaus proposes. Is,

64. Boulding, Book Review, 7 J. ECON. ISSUES 667, 667-68 (1973) (statement
tentatively attributed to Bacon).
65. J. HALL, supra note 49, at 75; Lloyd, Natural Law, in INTRODUCTION TO
JURISPRUDENCE 74, 84 (D. Lloyd ed., 3d ed. 1973). See A. D'ENTREVES, supra note 12, at
160 (quoting Vico); C. FRIEDRICH, supra note 45, at 205-06, 214; L. Fuller, Positivism
and Fidelity to Law, in INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 243 (D. Lloyd ed., 3d ed. 1973);
W. Rees, The Theory of Sovereignty, in IINTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 225 (D.
Lloyd ed., 3d ed. 1973); E. SCHUR, supra note 13, at 58 (quoting Robert Gordis);
Selznick, supra note 48, at 26; J. STONE, supra note 11, at 53; Hazard, Soviet Socialism
and the Due Process of Law, 48 MICH. L. REV. 1061, 1078 (1950).
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for example, a particular rule of the British" Welfare State oppressive, liberating or a hopelessly complex mixture of conflicting
currents?
It is unlikely that Pastor Neuhaus would give much thought to
a liberation through the state. In his theological view, state virtue
consists mainly of the avoidance of "sin" rather than in doing any of
those positive things he seems to associate with "the pretensions of
the modern state.167 Like Rawls, Neuhaus confuses justice with the
narrower concept of liberty. In politics, it no longer suffices to leave
persons at liberty: once laissez faire has been rejected, no one will
acquiesce voluntarily in a social system deemed to distribute power
and property unjustly. From the standpoint of legitimacy, the relevant concept is not Neuhaus' justice simpliciter but what Frank
Knight terms a justice expanded to cover all forms of social
idealism." The partly-conflicting values of Western society-order
(to which Neuhaus does not refer), justice and personal freedommust be pursued simultaneously while being held in a delicate
balance. The utilitarian values that Neuhaus terms an inhibition of
his "critical reason""' help to coordinate and to stabilize attempts to
pursue these goals efficiently. There are also peculiarly legal values,
such as a unified and consistent legal system, which seek to ensure
that like persons or circumstances can be treated alike. There are
still other values which cannot be pursued because they either provoke acute controversy or, like love and mercy, are clearly beyond
the ability of law to achieve. Like H.L.A. Hart's "minimum content"
of natural law, Neuhaus' arguments optimistically require us to love
each other as we love ourselves."
In the last few paragraphs, I have tried to show that the
causes and cures of legitimation crises are much broader and deeper
66. I have cast my example onto foreign soil because for some, an American
Welfare State approaches a contradiction in terms.
67. Neuhaus at 12.
68. Knight, supra note 20, at 1-3. See E. BODENHEIMER, supra note 45, at
116-17 (quoting Emil Brunner, a Swiss Calvinist); C. FRIEDRICH, supra note 45, at 192;
B. RUSSELL, supra note 7. at 189-90; J. STONE, supra note 11, at 333. Cf. P. STEIN & J.
SHAND, supra note 13, at 142: "The principle of personal freedom must ... always be
combined with that of equality, so that everyone in the community is equally able to
do what he wants, but only to the extent that everyone else may do likewise." A noble
prescription, but difficult to apply.
69. R. DIAS, supra note 18, at 671, 672-73; P. STEIN & J. SHAND, supra note 13,
at 1, passim; Neuhaus at 7, 12.
70. See R. DIAS, supra note 18, at 669; M. GINSBERG, supra note 20, at 213-14;
P. STEIN & J. SHAND, supra note 13, at 2, 257; Neuhaus at 5; note 48 supra.
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than Neuhaus would have us believe. His views stem at least in part
from the implicit adoption of a superficial model of law based on
litigation under private (as opposed to public) laws. This model
causes him to neglect many significant ongoing social relations7 1 and
to overemphasize the role of the courts in the legal system and in
the state (a tendency shared by many lawyers). For example, the
Supreme Court's role in securing governmental legitimacy is at best
tangential: the breadth of the Court's power lacks popular or constitutional sanction or accountability. It is, however, simply not true
that, as Neuhaus argues, "courts persist in systematically ruling out
of order the moral traditions in which Western law has developed."7
Courts constantly seek these "traditions" within one of their most
effective (but admittedly secular) digests, the Constitution; to go further would be to violate one or more of the canons of the First
Amendment that judges are sworn to uphold. As Justice
Frankfurter remarked, dissenting in Barnette, "only in a theocratic
state . . . [can] ecclesiastical doctrines measure legal right and
73'
wrong.
CONCLUSION

There is a role for theology and organized religion to play in
the pursuit of legitimacy and justice which is different from, but no
less significant than, the one mapped out by Neuhaus. Churches and
theologians should teach the duty to educate ourselves in selfcontrol, rather than rely on the illusion of a spontaneous self-control
emanating from the individual experiences that Neuhaus links to an
a priori, immutable rightness and wrongness through relational experiences. As things stand, theological arguments in support of
justice and legitimacy would attract some while repelling others;
bridges must thus be built, by Christians and non-Christians alike,
spanning the "is" and the "ought." Historically, natural law has
reflected the constant concern of theologians to find a common
ground between Christians and non-Christians. 7 This jus inter
gentes, rather than a new "worldview" or jus gentium, is what is
needed. Theologians must deal creatively with that which is
Caesar's: practical politics, the facts of power, the psychology of individuals in their everyday life, etc. Ignoring the facts of political
life can only result in an impotence in public matters.
71.
72.
73.
(1943). See
74.

See MacNeil, supra note 42.
Neuhaus at 12.
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 654
note 5 supra. Cf. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 872 (1978).
See J. ELLUL, supra note 5, at 10; J. STONE, supra note 11, at 320.
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If organized religion wishes effectively to influence events
which have a bearing on justice and legitimacy, pragmatic policies
must be pursued through self-confessedly political organizations.
Pastor Neuhaus' repudiation of temporal power for the churches 5
may have great symbolic value, but it is an unrealistic stance for
several reasons. As any Soviet or Czech dissident can testify, the
evaluation of government's performance on the basis of moral
criteria is regarded as an intensely political act. It is so regarded in
this country too, where, contra Neuhaus,"' religious belief is privileged: certain "dissident" acts and omissions (refusals to salute the
flag, the Jonestown cult's interferences in United States foreign
relations) are immune from state interference under the First
Amendment if they are colorably grounded in religious belief.
Neuhaus' characterization of problems as amenable to legal, rather
than political or economic, solution is another deeply political stance.
There are distinct limitations on resolving complex issues solely
through the technical exercises in a normative tradition that account
for so much of legal activity. These limitations are not given sufficient weight by Neuhaus. Any Congressman could tell Pastor
Neuhaus that the churches are far from being dismissed from the
public arena." True, churches often ignore political issues or abstain
from intervention, but not to decide is to prefer the inertia of the
"is"-to choose the status quo-since the power to influence change
is manifest.
The major limitation on the political power of organized
religion is the existence of the same types of dissensus found among
other organizations which cross-cut society; it can be seen, for example, in the creation of a "conservative" Evangelical Law Reform
Movement in opposition to the "liberal" National Council of Churches.
One means by which this dissensus can be softened is provided by
the Christian democratic theories of Jacques Maritain. These have
been fairly successful in Europe on politics, and they seek to advance the kinds of meliorist policies Neuhaus seems to favor.78 The
choice of the means to justice and legitimacy remains open in
America for the foreseeable future, however. Fuller, Hart and
75. Neuhaus at 13. See note 10 supra.
76. See Neuhaus at 13.
77. Z. BANKOWSKI & J. MUNGHAM, IMAGES OF LAW 33, 36-37, 39 (1976); L.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 48, at vii; Shklar, supra note 2, at 34, 36; Neuhaus at 13.
78. See P. SIGMUND, supra note 11, at 188-90; P. STEIN and J. SHAND, supra
note 13, at 64-66. A distributive justice which is based on either works or need seems
to provoke intense opposition in the West. Some type of equity, which reduces the extremity of result from applying either criterion, is thus called for. Id.
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Neuhaus would have us rely on the empathy and benevolence of
politicians and administrators who, once displays of hypocrisy are
discounted, tend to respect theological or other criticisms only to
the extent that it is in their perceived best interests to do so.
Political self-interest is not the loftiest of promptings to justice; it is,
however, the only realistic one where a state, which has the power
to intervene extensively in daily life, is run by persons who offer
regular demonstrations of the severe limitations on their altruism.
As Rousseau remarked, "[e]verything conspires to take away from a
man who is set in authority over others the sense of justice and
reason."'" Frederick Douglass, the Black abolitionist, voiced the
essence of the matter in 1857: "power concedes nothing without a
demand.... Find out what people will submit to and you have the
exact amount of injustice and wrong which will be imposed on
them."'" In other words, rendering into the state its legitimacy (in
the narrower sense of a voluntary but revocable submission to
authority) must be made the quid pro quo of government's fulfillment of just demands. This notion can be traced from the Old Testament prophets, through early Christianity and to Locke's social contract and his "appeal to Heaven." In modern times, Del Vecchio has
termed this "historical life of the law" the "revindication of natural
law against the positive law which denies it."'" The first token of the
legitimacy of such a venture has remained the same throughout
history. It is a willingness to accept the stern duties Del Vecchio's
"revindication" imposes: "sacrifice and, in extreme cases, martyrdom."' 2 These duties are one possible meaning of the transsubjectivity Neuhaus mentions, but they are unlikely outcomes of
79. Rousseau, quoted in B. RUSSELL, supra note 7, at 673. See C. FRIEDRICH,
supra note 45, at 92 (citing David Hume); N. MOUZELIS, ORGANIZATION AND
BUREAUCRACY 129 (1967); B. RUSSELL, supra note 7, at 622; P. STEIN & J. SHAND, supra
note 13, at v.
80. Douglass, quoted in Carim, Violence and Social Change, New Internationalist, Jan. 1977, at 17. Cf. B. RUSSELL, supra note 7, at 700: "To frame a philosophy
capable of coping with men intoxicated with the prospect of almost unlimited power
and also with the apathy of the powerless is the most pressing task of our time."
81. G. DEL VECCHIO, supra note 51, at 158. See Viner, The Intellectual History
of Laissez Faire, 3 J.L. & ECON. 45, 47 (1960); note 51 supra.
82. G. DEL VECCHIO. supra note 51, at 158.
83.
Not by supine acquiescence in the established order nor by waiting idly
for justice to fall from on high do we truly conform to the vocation of our
juridical consciousness. This vocation calls us to an active and unceasing
participation in the eternal drama which has history for its theatre and
for its theme the struggle between good and evil ....
Id. at 176.
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putting his individualistic notions of justice to work in individualist
America. Persons like Martin Luther King, those who have a vision
of social justice and the will to work for it selflessly, are all too rare.
I hope to have paid the lecture the sincerest form of respect,
that of taking it seriously. Pastor Neuhaus has helped to give us an
awareness of the intensity and many-sidedness of judgments about
justice and legitimacy, matters too wide and deep for a single mind
to encompass. He does not pretend to be learned in the law, and he
articulates the views of many intelligent "laymen" in an informed
and impassioned way. To corrupt H.L.A. Hart's evaluation of the
•work of Holmes and John Austin," Neuhaus is seldom clearly wrong,
but when he is right he is not right clearly.
84. "Like our own Austin, . . . Holmes was sometimes clearly wrong; but
again like Austin, when this was so he was always wrong clearly." Hart, Positivism
and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REv. 593, 593 (1958).
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